

Our government has a history of undermining the United Nations and has been particularly bad regarding Iraq. In 1990, we bribed and threatened and punished the Security Council to force a vote endorsing our war. We bribed poor countries with cheap Saudi oil. We bribed China with diplomatic rehabilitation and new development aid.

And we told Yemen, the only Arab country on the Council, that its vote against our war would be "the most expensive vote you ever cast." And then we punished Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, with a cutoff of our entire \$70 million aid package.

As we try to impose our war again on a reluctant United Nations, I fear that the Yemen precedent is being recalled at the U.N. today. I hope that our friends and our allies who might be considering a different approach in the U.N. will not be intimidated by our unilateral abuse of this multilateral institution.

The President can always call us back, if he is ready. He says he is not ready. He says war is not imminent. So why are we giving him such an order?

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD an article from *The Guardian* entitled "The U.S. Has Been Seeking to Prevent a Resolution of the Iraq Crisis for the Past 8 Years."

[From the *Guardian*, Oct. 8, 2002]

THE U.S. HAS BEEN SEEKING TO PREVENT A RESOLUTION OF THE IRAQ CRISIS FOR THE PAST EIGHT YEARS

(By George Monbiot)

There is little that those of us who oppose the coming war with Iraq can now do to prevent it. George Bush has staked his credibility on the project; he has mid-term elections to consider, oil supplies to secure and a flagging war on terror to revive. Our voices are as little heeded in the White House as the singing of the birds.

Our role is now, perhaps, confined to the modest but necessary task of demonstrating the withdrawal of our consent, while seeking to undermine the moral confidence which could turn the attack on Iraq into a war against all those states perceived to offend US strategic interests. No task is more urgent than to expose the two astonishing lies contained in George Bush's radio address on Saturday, namely that "the United States does not desire military conflict, because we know the awful nature of war" and "we hope that Iraq complies with the world's demands". Mr. Bush appears to have done everything in his power to prevent Iraq from complying with the world's demands, while ensuring that military conflict becomes inevitable.

On July 4 this year, Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the United Nations, began negotiating with Iraq over the return of UN weapons inspectors. Iraq had resisted UN inspections for three and a half years, but now it felt the screw turning, and appeared to be on the point of capitulation. On July 5, the Pentagon leaked its war plan to the *New York Times*. The US, a Pentagon official revealed, was preparing "a major air campaign and land invasion" to "topple President Saddam Hussein". The talks immediately collapsed.

Ten days ago, they were about to resume. Hans Blix, the head of the UN inspections body, was due to meet Iraqi officials in Vienna, to discuss the practicalities of re-en-

tering the country. The US Airforce launched bombing raids on Basra, in southern Iraq, destroying a radar system. As the Russian government pointed out, the attack could scarcely have been better designed to scupper the talks. But this time the Iraqis, mindful of the consequences of excluding he inspectors, kept talking. Last Tuesday, they agreed to let the UN back in. The State Department immediately announced, with more candor than elegance, that it would "go into thwart mode".

It wasn't bluffing. The following day, it leaked the draft resolution on inspections it was placing before the UN Security Council. This resembles nothing so much as a plan for unopposed invasion. The decision about which sites should be "inspected" would no longer be made by the UN alone, but also by "any permanent member of the security council", such as the United States. The people inspecting these sites could also be chosen by the US, and they would enjoy "unrestricted rights to free, unrestricted and immediate movement" within Iraq, "including unrestricted access to presidential sites". They would be permitted to establish "regional bases and operating bases throughout Iraq", where they would be "accompanied . . . by sufficient U.S. security forces to protect them". They would have the right to declare exclusion zones, no-fly zones and "ground and air transit corridors". They would be allowed to fly and land as many planes, helicopters and surveillance drones in Iraq as they want, to set up "encrypted communication" networks and to seize "any equipment" they choose to lay hands on.

The resolution, in other words, could not have failed to remind Iraq of the alleged infiltration of the U.N. team in 1996. Both the Iraqi government and the former inspector Scott Ritter maintain that the weapons inspectors were joined that year by CIA covert operations specialists, who used the U.N.'s special access to collect information and encourage the republican guard to launch a coup. On Thursday, Britain and the United States instructed the weapons inspectors not to enter Iraq until the new resolution has been adopted.

As Milan Rai's new book *War Plan Iraq* documents, the U.S. has been undermining disarmament for years. The U.N.'s principal means of persuasion was paragraph 22 of the security council's resolution 687, which promised that economic sanctions would be lifted once Iraq ceased to possess weapons of mass destruction. But in April 1994, Warren Christopher, the U.S. secretary of state, unilaterally withdrew this promise, removing Iraq's main incentive to comply. Three years later his successor, Madeleine Albright, insisted that sanctions would not be lifted while Saddam remained in power.

The U.S. government maintains that Saddam Hussein expelled the U.N. inspectors from Iraq in 1998, but this is not true. On October 30, 1998, the U.N. rejected a new U.N. proposal by again refusing to lift the oil embargo if Iraq disarmed. On the following day, the Iraqi government announced that it would cease to cooperate with the inspectors. In fact it permitted them to continue working, and over the next six weeks they completed around 300 operations.

On December 14, Richard Butler, the head of the inspection team, published a curiously contradictory report. The body of the report recorded that over the past month "the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation", but his well-publicized conclusion was that "no progress" has been made. Russia and China accused Butler of bias. On December 15, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. warned him that his team should leave Iraq for its

own safety. Butler pulled out, and on the following day the U.S. started bombing Iraq.

From that point on, Saddam Hussein refused to allow U.N. inspectors to return. At the end of last year, Jose Bustani, the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, proposed a means of resolving the crisis. His organization had not been involved in the messy business of 1998, so he offered to send in his own inspectors, and complete the job the U.N. had almost finished. The U.S. responded by demanding Bustani's dismissal. The other member states agreed to depose him only after the United States threatened to destroy the organization if he stayed. Now Hans Blix, the head of the new U.N. inspectorate, may also be feeling the heat. On Tuesday he insisted that he would take his orders only from the security council. On Thursday, after an hour-long meeting with U.S. officials, he agreed with the Americans that there should be no inspections until a new resolution had been approved.

For the past eight years the U.S., with Britain's help, appears to have been seeking to prevent a resolution of the crisis in Iraq. It is almost as if Iraq has been kept on ice, as a necessary enemy to be warmed up whenever the occasion demands. Today, as the economy slides and Bin Laden's latest mocking message suggests that the war on terrorism has so far failed, an enemy which can be located and bombed is more necessary than ever. A just war can be pursued only when all peaceful means have been exhausted. In this case, the peaceful means have been averted.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Ms. RIVERS).

Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution for several reasons.

First, it retains Congress' constitutional authority and obligation to publicly act on any commitment of American troops or resources to military action. Unlike the other two resolutions before us, it does not endow the President with powers that do not exist in the Constitution.

Secondly, it promotes a multilateral solution to the world's problems. It repudiates the administration's recently announced preemptive doctrine, which would change the United States from a worldwide defender of democracy into a first-strike aggressor on the world stage.

Lastly and most importantly, it does not preclude any further action by Congress, should circumstances change, despite the hand-wringing that has gone on about our inability to deal with future instances.

Of course, the President is free to come back and ask the Congress for action. This is best of the three resolutions before us, and I hope my colleagues will support it.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. WATT).

Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lee amendment and encourage my colleagues to support the amendment.

I have been very disappointed with a number of my colleagues who have suggested to me that the Lee amendment is not viable. I submit to them that